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The addition of a clinical component to the traditional law
school curriculum has been proposed as an educational reform for
more than fifty years.1 During the past ten years, a period in which
many law schools have established clinical programs in earnest, the
debate over the value of such a reform has dominated the litera-
ture on legal education.2 This debate often has focused on whether
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School of Law. B.A., 1966, Brandeis University; J.D., 1969, Columbia University; Ph. D.,
1978, Brandeis University.
1. Probably the most influential early article on the subject was Frank, Why Not a
Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 907 (1933) [hereinafter cited as Clinical Lawyer-
School]; see also Frank, What Constitutes a Good Legal Education?, 19 A.B.A. J. 723
(1933) (speech summarizing University of Pennsylvania Law Review article). For a response
to Judge (then Professor) Frank, see Gardner, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?-Some
Reflections, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 785 (1934). Some legal clinics already were in operation in the
1920's and 1930's and were both supported and criticized. See, e.g., Bradway, The Begin-
ning of the Legal Clinic of the University of Southern California, 2 S. CAL. L. REV. 252
(1929); Bradway, Some Distinctive Features of a Legal Aid Clinic Course, 1 U. CH. L. REV.
469 (1934) [hereinafter cited as Distinctive Features]; David, The Clinical Lawyer-School:
The Clinic, 83 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1934); Fuchs, The Educational Value of a Legal
Clinic-Some Doubts and Queries, 8 Am. L. SCH. REv. 857 (1937); Harris, The Educational
Value of a Legal Aid Clinic-A Reply, 8 Am. L. SCH. REV. 860 (1937). In addition, the
University of Denver operated a "Legal Aid Dispensary" as early as 1905. See Merson, Den-
ver Law Students in Court: The First Sixty-Five Years, in CLINICAL EDUCATION AND THE
LAW SCHOOL OF THE FUTURE 138 (U. of Chicago Law School Conference Series No. 20) (E.
Kitch ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as LAW SCHOOL OF THE FUTURE].
2. The literature on clinical legal education is collected in part in two valuable bibliog-
raphies. G. GROSSMAN, CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY (Council
on Legal Education for Professional Responsibility 1974); Snyman, A Proposal for a Na-
tional Link-Up of the New Legal Services Corporation Law Offices and Law School
Clinical Training Programs, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 43, 56-66 (1979) (including some articles
relevant only to legal services). A review of recent volumes of the Journal of Legal Educa-
tion confirms this observation. See Holmes, Education for Competent Lawyering-Case
Method in a Functional Context, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 535, 536 n.3 (1976) (author suggests
reading "every other article in the Journal of Legal Education" for authority that there is no
shortage of solutions to the perceived failings of legal education). Two law review symposia
devoted largely to clinical legal education have been published in the past year. See Clinical
Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 345, 345-848 (1980); Sym-
posium, 40 MD. L. REV. 203, 203-347 (1981).
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the educational goals of clinical education justify the place that
these programs now occupy in law school curricula.3 Although the
participants have not been able to identify a single set of educa-
tional goals, the goals most often cited-training law students in
lawyering skills, introducing students to the full scope of the legal
system and its actors, and developing in students an understanding
and appreciation of professional responsibility issues4 -all empha-
3. Some commentators have argued that providing legal services is the primary goal of
clinical legal education. See, e.g., Kitch, Clinical Education and the Law School of the Fu-
ture, in LAW SCHOOL OF THE FUTURE, supra note 1, at 15-16; see also Paulsen, Involvement
and Clinical Training: An Evaluation, 41 U. COLO. L. REv. 461 (1969). Others have pro-
pounded the service goal in the criminal law context. See, e.g., Spangenberg, Legal Services
for the Poor: The Boston University Roxbury Defender Project, 1965 U. ILL. L.F. 63. But
see id. at 72 ("Let us also not lose sight of the educational value of these programs for the
future members of the bar."). Although the provision of legal services to the community is a
welcomed by-product of any clinical program, the majority of clinical legal educators are
right to emphasize the educational values of clinical legal education. See, e.g., Barnhizer,
The Clinical Method of Legal Instruction: Its Theory and Implementation, 30 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 67 (1979); Ferren, The Teaching Mission of the Legal Aid Clinic, 1969 LAW & Soc.
ORD. 37; Vetri, Educating the Lawyer: Clinical Experiences as an Integral Part of Legal
Education, 50 OR. L. REv. 57 (1970). Obviously, educational and service goals are not mutu-
ally exclusive in this context. See Johnson, Education Versus Service: Three Variations on
the Theme, in CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT 414 (Council on Legal Education
for Professional Responsibility 1973).
The question whether law schools are obligated to provide legal services to the commu-
nity has been addressed on its own merits outside of the specific context of clinical legal
education. See, e.g., Broden, A Role for Law Schools in OEO's Legal Services Program, 41
NOTRE DAME LAW. 898 (1966); Brown, The Trumpet Sounds: Gideon-A First Call to the
Law School, 43 Thx. L. REv. 312 (1965). See generally McGee, Universities, Law Schools,
Communities: Learning or Service or Learning and Service?, 22 J. LEGAL EDUC. 37 (1969).
For a discussion of problems associated with student representation in criminal cases, see
Hardaway, Student Representation of Indigent Defendants and the Sixth Amendment: On
a Collision Course?, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 499 (1980).
4. See, e.g., Gorman, Clinical Legal Education: A Prospectus, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 537,
551-55 (1971); Kitch, supra note 3, at 13-20; Meltsner & Schrag, Report From a CLEPR
Colony, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 581, 584-87 (1976); Vetri, supra note 3, at 62-69. If one of these
goals is singled out over the others, it tends to be the teaching of professional responsibility.
See, e.g., Barnhizer, supra note 3, at 71-79; Sacks, Student Fieldwork as a Technique in
Educating Law Students in Professional Responsibility, 20 J. LEGAL EDUC. 291 (1968). The
goal of introducing students to the full scope of the legal system can be achieved with a wide
variety of approaches. In a recent article, Professors Wizner and Curtis urged that clinical
programs should both introduce students to "the workings of the legal system," and provide
a laboratory for students and faculty to study and develop reform in areas of substantive
law and parts of the legal process. See Wizner & Curtis, "Here's What We Do": Some Notes
About Clinical Legal Education, 29 CLEV. ST. L. Rv. 673, 678-79 (1980). Others outside of
the clinical context have addressed the goal of developing skills. See, e.g., Burger, Some
Further Reflections on the Problem of Adequacy of Trial Counsel, 49 FORDHAM L. REv. 1
(1980); The Place of Skills in Legal Education: 1944 Report of the Committee on Curricu-
lum of the Association of American Law Schools, 45 COLUM. L. REv. 345 (1945). Commenta-
tors also have proposed other goals for clinical legal education. See, e.g., Clark & Leleiko,
House Counsel for the Poor-An Experiment in Clinical Legal Education, 17 How. L.J.
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size the ability to offer new areas of substantive learning as the
primary, if not exclusive, value of clinical legal education. Consis-
tent with the establishment of these goals, either separately or in
some combination with one another, proponents of clinical educa-
tion have presented and justified their techniques to the legal com-
munity as a way to teach subject matter-the skills of the law
practice, the reality of the legal system, and the issues of profes-
sional responsibility-that is not taught or cannot be taught effec-
tively in the traditional law school curriculum.5
Clinical legal education does offer new subject areas for study
in law school, and some advocates justify it on this basis alone. A
simple subject matter justification, however, ignores perhaps the
most important contribution of clinical legal education to the mod-
ern law school. Clinical education is as much a new methodol-
ogy-a system for teaching law-as it is a vehicle for teaching new
areas of law. Although many commentators and clinical teachers
recognize that clinical education is a valid method for teaching law,
they usually emphasize the expanded substantive material that is
614 (1972) (increase awareness of legal problems of the poor); Leleiko, Clinical Education,
Empirical Study, and Legal Scholarship, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 149 (1979) (contribute to legal
scholarship through empirical studies); Levi, What Can the Law Schools Do?, 18 U. CH. L.
REV. 746 (1951) (stimulate research); Swords, The Public Service Responsibilities of the
Bar: The Goal for Clinical Legal Education, 25 U. Mi~.ii L. REv. 267 (1971) (teach social
responsibilities of the legal profession).
5. The early commentators, such as Judge Frank and the first clinical teachers, also
had adopted this rationale. See Frank, A Plea for Lawyer-Schools, 56 YALE L.J. 1303 (1947);
Clinical Lawyer-School, supra note 1. In 1933 Professor Bradway set forth five objectives
for his clinic at Duke University Law School that were directed at expanding the substan-
tive content of the law school curriculum: (1) To provide a course in practice through expe-
rience; (2) to provide an opportunity for students to synthesize the substantive and proce-
dural law learned in traditional courses; (3) to allow students to learn about the attorney-
client relationship; (4) to allow students to learn about the attorney-attorney relationship;
and (5) to teach students how cases develop from the beginning. Distinctive Features, supra
note 1, at 469-73. Students also have expressed similar thoughts concerning the primary
value of clinical legal education. See, Cowgill, Hoerger & Ridberg, Report of the Student
Participants, in LAW SCHOOL OF THE FUTURE, supra note 1, at 29 (summary of law students'
central points at the Law Students in Court conference sponsored by the University of Chi-
cago Law School which were largely supportive of clinical legal education because of its
ability to expand the substantive content of the curriculum).
6. A subject matter justification for clinical legal education is not necessarily a narrow
justification; in effect, it will be as broad as the new subject matter introduced into the
curriculum by the clinical program. Thus, the president of the Council on Legal Education
for Professional Responsibility put forward a strong subject matter justification for clinical
legal education when he argued that clinical programs which emphasized skills, training and
issues of professional responsibility would prompt law schools to become "involved as the
place to train practioners, and as a center working to reform the machinery of justice
through clinical work." Pincus, The Clinical Component in University Professional Educa-
tion, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 283, 296 (1971).
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made available to the law student, rather than the value of the
clinical approach as a teaching method, as the primary value of
clinical legal education. There are, of course, exceptions to this
trend in emphasis. For example, when Gary Bellow wrote about
the elements of clinical methodology for an early conference on
clinical education, he urged that putting students in a professional
role, using students' experiences as a focus for instruction, and
teaching under the tensions inherent in the teacher-student/super-
visor-supervisee relationship of clinical law practice are conditions
that facilitate learning.8 Similarly, Robert Condlin in a recent arti-
cle examined actual dialogues between clinical teachers and law
students to explore how clinical teachers teach and to determine
whether the full potential of clinical legal education as a teaching
method is being realized.9
Nevertheless, a fully satisfactory examination of the goals and
values of clinical legal education remains to be made. In particular,
a coherent, methodology-based justification for clinical programs
does not exist. Future inquiries into these matters unquestionably
should recognize both the expansion in substantive content and
the improvements in teaching methods that the addition of a
clinical component to legal education can effect at law schools.10 It
7. Although Professor Bradway stated that "[tihe clinic course differs from other
methods of instruction in approach, in method, and in material or content," Distinctive
Features, supra note 1, at 472, when he compared the clinical method with lecture, text-
book, and case methods of instruction, he emphasized that students can learn much more in
a clinical setting, not that they can learn any better. Id. at 472-73.
8. Bellow, On Teaching The Teachers: Some Preliminary Reflections on Clinical Ed-
ucation As Methodology, in CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT, supra note 3, at
379-94.
9. Condlin, Socrates' New Clothes: Substituting Persuasion for Learning in Clinical
Practice Instruction, 40 MD. L. Rav. 223 (1981). Professor Condlin's results suggested to
him that clinical teachers may be teaching in a manner that is not all that different from
traditional law teachers. Condlin, however, believes that clinical instruction-if properly im-
plemented by what he calls the "learning mode" rather than the "persuasion mode"--is a
valuable and unique teaching method. Id. at 275.
10. Professors Bellow and Johnson recognized the interplay of both of these values of
clinical education when they planned their clinical semester at the University of Southern
California:
[I]f understanding and knowledge are the focus of legal education, then the small por-
tion of lawyer experience on which law schools presently concentrate is far too narrow a
context for the intensity and expense of our endeavors. In part it was this problem that
led U.S.C. to experiment with enlarging the experiences, problems, and contexts within
which teaching and learning could occur.
Bellow & Johnson, Reflections on the University of Southern California Clinical Semester,
44 S. CAL. L. REv. 664, 688-89 (1971). Similarly, when Professor Barnhizer urged that the
clinical method is well suited to teach professional responsibility, he also set forth several
critical elements of successful clinical instruction that must exist to establish a favorable
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is also appropriate, however, to single out the generally overlooked
value of clinical legal education as an innovative methodology and
to examine whether this value can provide a more substantial, last-
ing justification for clinical legal education than those rationales
that have been propounded in the past. This Article seeks to es-
tablish a new justification for clinical legal education based on its
value as methodology. This justification is founded on a new con-
cept in education theory that provides a consistent and logical ra-
tionale both for adopting a methodology-based justification for
clinical education and for considering certain related impli-
cations."
Modern education theory has produced the concept of an-
dragogy, which when applied to professional legal education, fo-
cuses on one particular aspect of this type of education that tends
to be ignored when educational goals are discussed, either for law
schools generally or in the specific context of the value of clinical
legal education. This aspect is that law students are experienced
students, are at least in their early twenties and often much older,
and are about to begin-and in many cases are already participat-
ing in-the practice of law. Andragogical theory originally was
designed to provide a framework for analyzing teaching programs
for adults.12 The theory, therefore, can in turn serve as a coherent,
theoretical background for a methodology-based justification both
for the clinical method of legal instruction and for the addition of
a clinical component to the law school curriculum. In the following
sections of this Article the basic concepts of andragogy are dis-
cussed and examined to explore the andragogical basis for using
the clinical method for teaching law students. The Article makes
suggestions about how an understanding of andragogical principles
can improve the quality of clinical instruction in particular and,
therefore, the quality of legal education in general. After this gen-
eral discussion of andragogy and clinical legal education, sugges-
tions are also made concerning the details of implementing a pro-
posed andragogical model for clinical programs."
climate for learning. Barnhizer, supra note 3, at 72-75.
11. As noted earlier, clinical educators have touched upon the value of clinical educa-
tion as methodology. See supra text accompanying notes 7-9; see also infra text accompany-
ing notes 60-85. No commentator, however, has transformed these observations into any
coherent, theoretical framework, and, as a result, the observations tend to be idiosyncratic.
Consequently, no identifiable clinical methodology has emerged. Compare Bellow, supra
note 8, with Barnhizer, supra note 3.
12. See infra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 86-118 and accompanying text.
1982]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:321
No single model for implementing the clinical method is uni-
versally accepted.1 As a result, a certain imprecision inheres in the
term "clinical legal education" that must be addressed at the out-
set of any inquiry into this field. For the purposes of this Article,
the term clinical legal education-including variations such as
"clinical programs" and "the clinical method"-refers to any law
school course or program in which law students participate in the
representation of actual clients under the supervision of a lawyer!
teacher. Courses limited to simulation and unsupervised place-
ments, therefore, are not included in the definition.15
II. ANDRAGOGY
In a seminal work that was published in 1970, Malcolm S.
Knowles introduced the concept of andragogy to modern education
theory to separate the concerns that are peculiar to adult educa-
tion from those theretofore addressed in traditional education
literature.18 In coining the new term, which is derived by substitut-
14. See Grossman, Clinical Legal Education: History and Diagnosis, 26 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 162, 173-86 (1974); Meltsner & Schrag, supra note 4, at 587-624.
15. Most clinicians use simulations to some extent as a part of their method of in-
struction. Indeed, clinical teachers who write on simulation as a teaching technique often
include actual client representation as an element in their program. Thus, the authors of a
widely circulated text on simulation concluded after experimentation that simulation alone
was not a satisfactory clinical experience. See M. MELTSNER & P. SCHRAG, TOWARD SIMULA-
TION IN LEGAL EDUCATION (1975); Meltaner & Schrag, supra note 4, at 624-28; see also Har-
baugh, Simulation and Gaming: A Teaching/Learning Strategy For Clinical Legal Educa-
tion, in GUIDELINES FOR CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION 191 (Association of American Law
Schools/American Bar Association 1980); Bastress & Harbaugh, Examining Lawyers' Skills,
in id. at 223, 227. In its recent report the Committee on Guidelines for Clinical Legal Educa-
tion of the Association of American Law Schools and the American Bar Association con-
cluded that "the clinical legal studies curriculum should, if at all possible, include some
experience working on live cases or problems." Id. at 65. Cf. id. at 20 (actual guideline for
the use of clinical teaching methods states: "Where resources, cases, and law permit, law
student work on live cases or problems is a valuable but not an exclusive [clinical]
method"). Legal educators in the past have raised concerns about the additional costs of
having actual client representation clinics rather than relying solely on simulation tech-
niques. See, e.g., ASSoCIATIoN OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFES-
SIONS OF THE LAW: 1971 (P. Carrington ed. 1971), in 1971 AALS PROCEEDINGS, Part 1, § II, at
41 [hereinafter cited as TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSIONS OF THE LAW]. But see Brick-
man, Book Review, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 843, 850-52.
The exclusion of unsupervised placements from the term clinical legal education needs
no explanation. See generally Campbell, Training Law Students Outside the Classroom:
Some Experience and Some Comments, 26 J. LEGAL EDUC. 208 (1974). See also Wizner &
Curtis, supra note 4, at 681-82.
16. M. KNOWLES, THE MODERN PRACTICE OF ADULT EDUCATION (1970). For a discussion
of some similar concerns in a very different context, see P. FRIEE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OP-
PRESSED (1970). Friere, a Brazilian educator, criticizes traditional teacher-dominated rela-
tionships and suggests mutual interaction between teacher and student as the basis for a
326
CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION
ing the Greek stem andr, meaning adult, for the stem paid, mean-
ing child, as the latter is used in the term pedagogy, Knowles in-
tended to communicate that andragogy is "the art and science of
helping adults learn. ' 17 Knowles felt that a distinction between an-
dragogy and traditional pedagogy was necessary because, as the
dominant use of the term pedagogy in education literature implies,
"most teachers of adults have only known how to teach adults as if
they were children." '18
Before examining the basic elements of Knowles' andragogy
and the appropriateness of its application to clinical legal educa-
tion, at least three limitations on the discussion must be recog-
nized. First, professional education of adults is fundamentally dif-
ferent from the general field of adult education that applies
andragogical theory to activities such as continuing, remedial, and
supplemental education programs. The typical participants in
adult education programs attend part-time, postformal education
courses that concentrate on specific vocational skills or specialty
subjects which are designed for personal enrichment or amuse-
ment. 9 Second, although adults are distinguishable from children
in certain educationally relevant ways that make the theory of an-
dragogy useful, the types and ages of adults vary widely, and law
students are not necessarily typical of the adult learners that are
the focus and subject of andragogical literature.2 0 Last, despite its
great impact on the field of adult education, not all educators are
convinced that even the basic premises of andragogy are either cor-
politically-oriented pedagogy aimed at liberating the oppressed. Id. at 57-118.
17. M. KNOWLES, supra note 16, at 38. The book is subtitled Andragogy Versus
Pedagogy. Apparently, the term andragogy had surfaced earlier in some European education
literature. See M. KNOWLES, THE ADULT LEARNER: A NEGLECTED SPECIES 49-50 (2d ed.
1978).
18. M. KNOWLES, supra note 16, at 37. Knowles also stated that "[m]ost of what is
known about learning has been learned from studies of learning in children and animals."
Id.
19. See generally ADULT LEARNING (M. Howe ed. 1977); R. HAVIGHURST & B. ORR,
ADULT EDUCATION AND ADULT NEEDS (1956); A. KNOX, ADULT DEVELOPMENT AND LEARNING
(1977). Continuing legal education, which is in many ways analogous to general adult educa-
tion, is not within the scope of this Article. See infra note 50.
20. See Morstain & Smart, A Motivational Typology of Adult Learners, 48 J. HIGHER
EDUC. 665 (1977) (study presenting a typological framework of adult learners to analyze
their motivation identified five distinct types: Nondirected; social; stimulation seeking; ca-
reer oriented; and life change); see also Lebel, Beyond Andragogy to Gerogogy, 1 LIFELONG
LEARNING: THE ADULT YEARS 16, 18 (1978) (the adult learner described by Knowles "is not
functionally descriptive of the elderly learner"); cf. Meyer, Andragogy and the Aging Adult
Learner, 2 EDUC. GERONTOLOGY 115 (1977) (andragogically based model for aging student
learners found to be effective).
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rect or valuable.21 Nonetheless, andragogy provides legal educators
with a coherent- and viable theory of instruction that is applicable
to adult law students. Andragogical theory presents optimal condi-
tions for adult learning by establishing norms for the instructor
that offer distinct advantages over the existing literature on legal
education.22 As a theory of instruction, andragogy can be useful
both to evaluate existing methods of law teaching-including the
clinical method-and to suggest possible improvements of those
methods.
A. Underlying Assumptions of Andragogy
Knowles' theory of andragogy is premised on four underlying
assumptions about the characteristics of adult learners that are
drawn largely from the work of clinical psychologists such as Abra-
ham H. Maslow and Carl R. Rogers.23 These assumptions relate to
how self-concept, the role of experience in learning, readiness to
learn, and orientation to learning change from childhood to adult-
hood; they lead to the conclusion that adults are substantially dif-
ferent from children in these respects and that a theory of instruc-
tion that takes into account the self-concept of adults, the role of
experience in adult learning, adults' readiness to learn, and their
orientation to learning will of necessity differ from a theory based
on traditional pedagogy.
The first assumption which Knowles makes is that adults see
themselves as self-directing personalities, unlike children who ex-
pect the will of adults to be imposed on them. Adults' self-concept
is such that they expect to make their own decisions, face the con-
21. See McKenzie, The Issue of Andragogy, 27 ADULT EDUC. 225 (1977); Weiland, Un-
garnered Harvest: Adult Learners and Liberal Education, 43 LIBERAL EDUc. 477 (1977)
(most questions raised about andragogy relate to the purpose of adult education, not how to
teach adults). Compare Lebel, supra note 20, with Meyer, supra note 20. But see authorities
cited infra note 47.
22. See Coleman, Differences Between Experiential and Classroom Learning, in Ex-
PERIENTIAL LEARNING 49 (M. Keeton ed. 1976). See generally J. BRUNER, TOWARD A THEORY
OF INSTRUCTION (1966). Knowles recognizes that although techniques have been developed
for teaching adults, the writings on the processes of adult learning have not supported them.
M. KNOWLES, supra note 17, at 27. Legal education literature traditionally has included only
descriptive analyses of how and what law students can learn. For a discussion of existing
articles on the clinical method of legal instruction, see infra notes 89-90 and accompanying
text.
23. See M. KNOWLES, supra note 17, at 39-43; M. KNOWLES, supra note 16, at 24-28.
Knowles seems to have relied particularly on A. MASLOW, MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITY
(1954), and C. ROGERS, CLIENT-CENTERED THERAPY (1951).
[Vol. 35:321
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sequences of their decisions, and manage their own lives.24 Indeed,
Knowles asserts that one becomes an adult psychologically only
when one perceives of oneself as wholly self-directing.2 5
The second assumption underlying the theory of andragogy is
that adults accumulate a greater amount and variety of experience
than children, and, as a result, their experience becomes a greater
resource for learning.2' In addition, Knowles argues that this dif-
ference of quantity and quality of experience is heightened by a
difference between children and adults as to the importance of
their experiences to them. According to Knowles, while children
take note of their experiences,"to an adult, his experience is him.
He defines who he is, establishes his self-identity, in terms of his
accumulation of a unique set of experiences. '2 7
The third assumption is based on the concept of "developmen-
tal tasks." Developmental tasks are those tasks that must be dealt
with at various stages in life if one is to pass from one phase of
personal development to the next.28 Educators have found that
children demonstrate a heightened readiness to learn those tasks
that are appropriate for them to master at a given phase of their
development.2'9 Knowles assumes from this finding that adults also
will have a heightened readiness to learn those developmental
tasks that are appropriate for them. Adult developmental tasks are
keyed primarily to the various social roles that adults must fulfill.30
Thus, as adults' social roles change, their developmental tasks
change, and their readiness to learn any particular subject matter
or skill changes with each change in appropriate developmental
tasks.
Knowles' final assumption is that adults seek to apply learning
immediately, while children tend to see acquired knowledge solely
as a future benefit. Since education to children is the accumulation
of knowledge for future use, children study in a subject-centered
frame of mind.3 1 By contrast, adults "engage in learning largely in
response to pressures they feel from their current life situation....
24. M. KNOWLES, supra note 16, at 39-40.
25. Id. at 40.
26. Id. at 44.
27. Id. (emphasis in original).
28. See generally R. HAVIGHURST, DEVELOPMENTAL TASKS AND EDUCATION (1961).
29. M. KNOWLES, supra note 16, at 45-46.
30. Id. at 46-47.
31. Id. at 48. Thus, Knowles asserts that children learn in elementary school to pre-
pare for high school, learn in high school to prepare for college, and learn in college to
prepare for adult life. Id.
1982] 329
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They tend, therefore, to enter an educational activity in a prob-
lem-centered frame of mind.""2
B. Methodological Implications of the Underlying
Assumptions of Andragogy
Each of the four underlying assumptions of andragogy led
Knowles to a set of related "technological implications" for the ed-
ucation of adults. These implications in turn can serve as a guide
for an andragogical methodology for legal education in general and
for clinical legal education in particular.33 Before applying this
methodology, however, Knowles' implications for each of the as-
sumptions of andragogy must be examined in some detail.
1. Self-Concept
Knowles considers the change in self-concept-from the de-
pendent child to the self-directing adult-to be the most impor-
tant difference between children and adults as learners.3 The
methodological implications of this change for teachers of adults
reach into the climate of the learning environment to be estab-
lished and the relationship between learner and teacher in plan-
ning, conducting, and evaluating the course of study.
According to Knowles, the most important aspect of the adult
learning environment is the psychological climate, which "should
be one which causes adults to feel accepted, respected, and sup-
ported; in which there exists a spirit of mutuality between teachers
and students as joint inquirers."3 5 Knowles believes that an-
dragogical methodology requires teachers to show interest in and
respect for their students by listening to them and making use of
their contributions; educators should not view their students as
"receiving sets for [the teacher's] transmissions of wisdom. '3 6
Knowles also argues that this "climate of adultness" is most effec-
tive when extended beyond individual classes to the institution as
a whole.37
Knowles discusses two aspects of course planning in the con-
32. Id.
33. See infra notes 49-118 and accompanying text.
34. M. KNOWLES, supra note 16, at 44.
35. Id. at 41. Knowles also mentions that physical climate (e.g., furnishings and deco-
rations) can be of some concern when adults are taught in programs that are located at





text of the self-concept of adults and andragogical methodology.
The first of these aspects is that self-directing adults can be ex-
pected to be more deeply motivated when they are learning what
they think they need to learn and when they participate in the
planning of their course of study. Accordingly, students in an an-
dragogically sound educational setting are required to participate
both in the diagnosis of their learning needs and in the planning of
how and when they are to be taught."8
The second aspect relates to the actual process of teaching and
to the evaluation of learning for self-directing adults, and follows
the same theme. Knowles argues that the attitudes underlying
traditional pedagogical practice-in which the teacher alone takes
responsibility for teaching and learning, as well as for evaluating
the students' progress and performance-conflict with the self-con-
cept of self-directing adults. To correct this conflict, andragogical
practice calls for dividing responsibility equally between teacher
and student for the execution of the teaching process and the eval-
uation of learning.3 9
2. Role of Experience
Andragogical methodology favors participatory, experiential
learning techniques-for example, exercises, role playing, field
work, seminars, and counseling-to reinforce the important role of
experience in the lives and learning of adults.40 The assumption is
that "the more active the learner's role in the process, the more he
is probably learning." 41 Because of the importance that adults
place on experiences, they naturally want to learn from experience;
indeed, they may even resent learning situations in which their ex-
perience is not being used. For this reason, adults' experiences are
included in andragogical methodology both by encouraging the use
of students' life experiences as illustrations and examples for learn-
ing, and by planning for students to use what they learn in their
38. Id. at 41-42. Knowles asserts that teachers who do all the planning for adult stu-
dents tend to encounter apathy, resentment, and withdrawal from their students. Id. at 42.
He states that "this imposition of the will of the teacher is incongruent with the adult's self-
concept of self-directivity." Id.
39. Id. at 42-44. In his own teaching experience, Knowles has tried to avoid a common
pitfall of pedagogical practice: "[T]each[ing] my students something I know they ought to
know but that they don't yet know they ought to know." He believes adult students find
that such overdirection inhibits their learning. Id. at 43.
40. Id. at 44-45. See generally Coleman, supra note 22; Houle, Deep Traditions of
Experiential Learning, in EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING, supra note 22, at 19.




3. Readiness to Learn
Concerning adults' readiness to learn, Knowles presents two
methodological implications that he derives from applying the con-
cept of developmental tasks to adult education. First, Knowles be-
lieves that because adults' developmental tasks parallel their social
roles, adult students should be taught matters that relate to ex-
isting or changing social roles appropriate to their personal devel-
opment.43 Thus, the curriculum must be timed to coordinate the
teaching of subjects or skills with the developmental tasks facing
the students at that time. Second, Knowles argues that students
who must deal with similar developmental tasks, that is, those with
similar social roles, should be grouped together so the course of
instruction can focus on their shared interests in learning.4'
4. Orientation to Learning
The major element of andragogical methodology that is re-
lated to adults' orientation to learning is based on the change in
adults from a subject-centered to a problem-centered frame of
mind. Thus, andragogical methodology calls for a shift in emphasis
from teaching the traditional subject areas to teaching material
likely to assist students in dealing with problems they will encoun-
ter. A proper andragogical approach would teach about problem
areas that the students will deal with at or close to the time of
learning, rather than offer broad coverage of general subjects that
have little or no relation to the students' relatively short-term
goals and ambitions.' 5
C. The Application of Andragogy Beyond Adult Education
As noted earlier, Knowles' work on andragogy has been fol-
lowed and debated in the literature on adult education.46 Recently,
42. Id.
43. Id. at 47. Knowles poses the example of unsuccessful attempts to teach supervision
techniques to workers who are not yet secure in doing the jobs that they would be called
upon to supervise. Id.
44. Id. at 47-48.
45. Id. at 48-49. Of course, the teacher cannot allow the student's short-term goals to
limit the course of study absolutely. Knowles does not mean to suggest "that a good adult-
learning experience ends with the problems the learners are aware of in the beginning, but
that is where it starts." Id. at 49.
46. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. See also M. KNOWLES, SELF-DIRECTED
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educators have begun to discuss and apply andragogical theory to
educational programs outside of the field of adult educa-
tion-including various fields of professional education. Two re-
cent studies found that andragogical methodology which empha-
sized self-direction and active, experiential learning was effective
in the training of social workers.'7 Another recent study reached
similar conclusions concerning the training of nurses. 8 Obviously a
number of similarities exist between andragogical methodology and
the clinical method of legal instruction, particularly in the use of
experiential learning techniques. In part Ill of this Article, the ba-
sic assumptions and methodological implications of andragogy are
discussed, and the potential application of these assumptions and
implications to clinical legal education is analyzed.
III. ANDRAGOGY AND CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION
As with any general theory based largely on a single idea, a
danger of tautology exists when one attempts to explain and apply
the theory of andragogy at a practical level through numerous ex-
amples. Although Knowles and those following him have elabo-
rated upon and expanded the four basic assumptions of andragogy
and the methodological implications based on those assumptions,'49
the important elements of each andragogical assumption can be re-
duced to a single methodological point. These points can be
presented, in declining order of importance, as follows: (1) Learn-
ing should be through mutual inquiry by teacher and student
(adults' self-concept as self-directing); (2) emphasis should be on
LEARNING (1975); J. Ingalls & J. Arceri, A Trainers Guide to Andragogy, Its Concepts, Expe-
rience and Application (1972) (unpublished report available from Educational Resources In-
formation Center, Washington, D.C.).
47. See Faherty, Continuing Social Work Education: Results of a Delphi Survey, 15
J. EDUC. Soc. WORK 12 (1979); Gelfand, Rohrich, Nevidon & Starak, An Andragogical Ap-
plication to the Training of Social Workers, 11 J. EDuc. Soc. WORK 55 (1975).
48. Tibbles, Theories of Adult Education: Implications for Developing a Philosophy
for Continuing Education in Nursing, 8 J. CONT. EDUC. NURSING 25 (1977). Tibbles con-
cluded that "[g]ood planning and good teaching takes into account the adult need to be self-
directive. Learning should be both problem-centered and experience-centered. The adult
educator should be cognizant that readiness facilitates learning and that readiness in adults
is related to developmental requirements of social roles." Tibbles, supra note 47, at 28. See
generally Knowles, Innovations in Teaching Styles and Approaches Based upon Adult
Learning, 8 J. EDUC. Soc. WORK 32 (1972). For other applications of andragogy outside of
the field of adult education, see McCullough, Andragogy and Community Problem Solving,
2 LIFELONG LEARNING: THE ADULT YEARS 8 (1978); D. Brundage & D. MacKeracher, Adult
Learning Principles and Their Application to Program Planning (1980) (unpublished report
available from Educational Resources Information Center, Washington, D.C.).
49. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
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active, experiential learning (role of experience in adult leaning);
(3) learning should relate to concurrent changes in the students'
social roles (readiness to learn); and (4) learning should be
presented in the context of problems that students are likely to
face (orientation to learning).
These four central elements of andragogy and their related
methodological implications provide a theoretical framework for
examining the appropriateness of the methods by which law is
taught to adult law students both in clinical programs and
throughout legal education. This theoretical framework offers legal
educators the opportunity to plan a course of law study that is
fully consistent with the capabilities and aspirations of adult law
students. Although the purpose of this Article is to consider an-
dragogy as it applies to clinical programs, a few observations about
andragogy and legal education in general will help put in context
the subsequent discussions of the andragogical basis of and a pro-
posed andragogically-based model for clinical legal education.5 0
A. Andragogy and Traditional Legal Education
The application of the methodological implications of
Knowles' andragogy to legal education does not lead to a wholesale
indictment of the traditional case method of instruction as hope-
lessly nonandragogical. Indeed, although Knowles was primarily
concerned with developing theories about the means of adult
learning, he recognized that case method parables and Socratic di-
alogue are examples of useful techniques of adult education that
have existed since ancient times.51 Moreover, some aspects of
50. Continuing legal education is not addressed in this Article other than to note that
in theory such programs are the component of legal education that is most analogous to
adult education, but that in execution they are the least compatible with andragogical the-
ory with the exception of some courses in trial advocacy. Most continuing legal education
programs are offered in the form of live or tape-recorded lectures. See Cavin, Continuing
Legal Education: A Non-Objective View, 30 BAYLOR L. REv. 717, 718 (1978). The only con-
sistent departure from this format has been in the area of trial practice, in which courses
like those offered by the National Institute on Trial Advocacy and state bar associations use
problems and exercises that are based on simulations. For a discussion of the value of par-
ticipatory trial advocacy courses in the context of continuing legal education, see McCauliff,
Trial Advocacy: Improving the Quality of Legal Services Through Continuing Legal Edu-
cation Courses, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 536 (1980).
The field of continuing legal education has an entirely different mission from that of
traditional legal education, and, as a result, it has produced its own literature. See, e.g.,
Cavin, supra; Darrell, The Role of the Universities in Continuing Professional Education,
32 OHIO ST. L. REv. 312 (1971); Friday, Continuing Legal Education: Historical Back-
ground, Recent Developments, and the Future, 50 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 502 (1976).
51. M. KNOWLES, supra note 16, at 27; see also supra note 22.
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traditional law teaching methods not only are fully consistent with
andragogical theory, but also are premised-at least to some ex-
tent-on a recognition that law students are adult learners.s
One example-the act of really listening to what the student
says-is a technique of the case method of instruction which is
necessitated by its reliance on Socratic dialogue. This technique
requires mutual respect between teacher and student and is central
to the andragogical notion of deferring to the self-concept of
adults.58 In addition, the traditional dialogue between law teacher
and student that requires the student to analyze a case and explore
legal doctrine is itself an experiential learning technique, since the
process of case analysis is not taught in the abstract but instead
takes place with student participation at the time of learning.5
The exchange between teacher and student in the classroom does
not reach the andragogical standard of true mutual inquiry, how-
ever, at least to the extent that the teacher plans the dialogue in
advance and waits for certain answers that are used together with
assigned case materials to convey a particular mode of analysis or
point of law.55 Moreover, law students, particularly in the second
and third years, can choose not to participate in class and thus
adopt a passive role for most, if not all, of a course.
At least in a general sense, traditional legal education also
meets the andragogical concern that the content of law study
should match law students' readiness to learn and their orientation
to learning. By its very nature as professional training, legal educa-
tion takes into account the students' approaching changes in social
roles and orients learning to problems they are likely to encounter
in law practice. After all, law schools exist to enable law students
to become lawyers.56 After the first year, however, law students
52. This Article does not intend either to advocate or to discredit the traditional
methods of legal education. But see Kennedy, How the Law School Fails: A Polemic, 1 YALE
REv. L. & Soc. AcTION 71 (1970); Savoy, Toward a New Politics of Legal Education, 79
YALE L.J. 444 (1970).
53. M. KNOWLES, supra note 16, at 41. Unfortunately, law teacher listening is not al-
ways coupled with the interest in and respect for students that Knowles finds necessary for
optimal learning. Id.; see also supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
54. Bellow and Johnson support their argument that students should engage in actual
problem solving and decision making in order to learn the dynamics of those processes when
they state that "[w]e would not dream of teaching a student to analyze a case solely by
telling him about the case analysis process." Bellow & Johnson, supra note 10, at 690-91.
55. Cf. infra text accompanying notes 95-96 (discussing simulation as a clinical
method).
56. Regardless of a particular law school's place on the continuum from an "academic"
to a "professional" orientation, most law students go to law school to become lawyers. See
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often view traditional methods of legal instruction and the prepa-
ration required for traditional law classes to be far removed from
the type of professional education that they are ready to receive. 57
In sum, the basic elements of andragogy are found-at least to
some extent-in the traditional methods of legal instruction. As
Charles Reich has observed, however, law students "are not really
treated as adults. They are made to feel that they are beginning
their education all over again, and the classes put very little em-
phasis upon individual work and thinking."58 This brief discussion,
therefore, indicates that even traditional law teachers could im-
prove their teaching with a careful reading of Knowles' work.5'
B. Andragogy and Clinical Legal Education
The clinical method is now an accepted technique for teaching
law,60 notwithstanding the absence of either any empirical evidence
generally Levi, The Place of Professional Education in the Life of the University, 32 OHIO
ST. L. REv. 229 (1971).
57. Writing fifty years ago on the third year of law school, Felix Frankfurter noted
that "[a]t the end of the second year [law students] 'are sick' of reading cases merely as a
method of training or as a means of finding out what cases hold, what the doctrines are."
Memorandum from Felix Frankfurter to Grenville Clark (May 12, 1932), reprinted in
Dunne, The Third Year Blahs: Professor Frankfurter After Fifty Years, 94 HARv. L. REv.
1237 (1981) (1932 memorandum by Felix Frankfurter entitled "Some Observations on Third
Year Work" reproduced in unedited form). Obviously, treatment of material and students'
perceptions can vary from course to course. Thus, Frankfurter also stated that, "[o]n the
other hand, where the case is treated as a case and not merely as the depository of a hold-
ing, it is necessary to read the case, and the same student who had not read a case in two
other courses sedulously read every case in [Public Utilities]." Id. at 1238.
58. Reich, Toward the Humanistic Study of Law, 74 YALE L.J. 1402, 1403 (1965).
Traditional law teachers recognize the "problems of boredom and disengagement which
seem to plague traditional law teaching." Boyer & Cramton, American Legal Education: An
Agenda For Research and Reform, 59 CORNEL L. REV. 221, 281 (1974).
59. For example, teachers could establish a greater sense of mutual inquiry with stu-
dents by presenting at least a few new hypotheticals in each class that they had not worked
through beforehand and letting the students know that they would be analyzing the issues
together with the teacher for the first time. Another change that andragogical theory sug-
gests-the use of problem-oriented materials-has already begun to take place in the tradi-
tional curriculum. See infra text accompanying note 84.
60. Acceptance, however, does not mean universal acclaim. Clinical programs have
their critics in the law school community, but the argument that the clinical method of legal
instruction is a passing fad or a temporary appendage to older, traditional teaching methods
is outdated. For discussions of the debate over the value of clinical legal education, see Gee
& Jackson, Bridging the Gap: Legal Education and Lawyer Competency, 1977 B.Y.U. L.
REv. 695, 881-92; Grossman, supra note 14. See generally W. PINcus, CLINICAL EDUCATION
FOR LAW STUDENTS (1980). Perhaps the best indication of the acceptance of the clinical
method as part of the system of legal education in this country occurred in 1977 when the
Association of American Law Schools and the American Bar Association established a joint
committee to propose guidelines for clinical legal education, which published an extensive
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of its effectiveness or any accepted educational basis for clinical
programs.61 Clinical legal education has been accepted because le-
gal educators know that it has, in fact, become a significant part of
the system of legal education in this country."2 Andragogical theory
provides a new and more substantial reason for welcoming this
success because it shows how and why clinical legal education
meets the educational needs of adult law students at the threshold
of their professional careers.
Law students, of course, are a varied group. At a minimum,
they are college graduates, and in many cases they have worked or
have participated in some form of nonlaw, postgraduate education.
Law students, therefore, clearly are adults, and the concerns that
led to Knowles' andragogy thus are undoubtedly relevant to the
field of legal education. Moreover, the first year of law school is
uniformly perceived to be a unique experience for all law stu-
dents-at least to the extent that they must be introduced to new
areas of study and new methods of inquiry. As a result, the second
report in 1980. See GUIDELINES FOR CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 15.
61. See supra text accompanying notes 3-10; Barnhizer, supra note 3, at 67 ("Despite
[the] expansion [of clinical programs], however, there has been a failure to sufficiently de-
velop the theoretical dimensions of clinical legal education."). Clinicians need not be partic-
ularly defensive about the lack of an accepted educational basis for clinical programs, be-
cause clinical education is no different in this regard from the rest of legal education. See
Lowry & Kennedy, Clinical Law in the Area of Mental Health, 1979 WIs. L. REV. 373, 386
("law schools have yet to establish a coherent pedagogical theory of traditional legal educa-
tion and are, consequently, unable to provide a critical theory of law clinics and other such
innovations"); cf. Allen, The New Anti-Intellectualism in American Legal Education, 28
MERCER L. REV. 447 (1977) (Professor Allen states,
It is probably true that the greatest obstacle before the clinical movement has not been
the opposition of the law teachers who object to it on basic intellectual or pedagogical
grounds. More important have been the doubts of other established faculty members,
who are by no means unsympathetic to the asserted ends of clinical training but who
are bewildered about how to evaluate the quality of clinical programs and instructors,
how to determine what features of traditional education should be sacrificed to make
way for it and how to pay for it.
Id. at 456).
62. Annual reports on clinical legal education published by the Council on Legal Edu-
cation for Professional Responsibility (CLEPR) from 1971 to 1979 demonstrate the tremen-
dous growth rate of clinical programs in this country's law schools during the past decade.
See SURVEY OF CLINICAL AND OTHER EXTRA-CLASSROOM EXPERIENCES IN LAw SCHOOLS 1970-
1971 (CLEPR 1971); SURVEY OF CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION 1971-1972, 1972-1973, 1973-1974
(CLEPR 1972, 1973, 1974); SURVEY AND DIRECTORY OF CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION 1974-1975,
1975-1976, 1976-1977, 1977-1978, 1978-1979 (CLEPR 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979). The
clinical programs at 57 law schools are described in Appendix, Selected Summaries of Law
School Clinical Programs, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 735 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Selected
Summaries]. Almost all state courts and many federal courts allow supervised student prac-
tice, usually only in the third year of law school. See Appendix, Student Practice Rules, 29
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 817 (1980).
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and third years of law school must be designed to take into ac-
count that second and third year law students are different from
those who first enter law school.63 Often by their second year, and
almost certainly by their third year, law students have spent a
summer working in a law office and may be working part-time dur-
ing the year; thus, the line between approaching entry and actual
entry into the profession becomes blurred. How clinical legal edu-
cation can meet the requirements of an andragogically based pro-
gram of instruction for such experienced, adult law students is the
subject of the following subsections.
1. Learning Through Mutual Inquiry by Teacher and Student
The recognition of adults as self-directing learners is the most
important source of the departures from traditional pedagogy that
are contained in Knowles' andragogy. The key methodological im-
plication that follows from this recognition is the creation of a
learning climate which includes what Knowles calls "a spirit of
mutuality between teachers and students as joint inquirers. ' '64 The
idea is that teachers and their adult students, by working together,
can create a setting in which the students are both acting consis-
tently with their self-concept and benefiting from the teaching of
their co-inquirer/teacher.
The clinical method of legal instruction applies this aspect of
andragogical methodology in a way that is otherwise unavailable in
the traditional law school curriculum. Gary Bellow and Earl John-
son describe the unique "two-way street" of the clinical experience
and its contrast with traditional law teaching as follows:
While the combative nature of the socratic method tends to substitute spar-
ring for learning, in a setting in which faculty and students find themselves in
a shared enterprise, and in which inquiry is concerned with emotional reac-
tion as well as analysis, the classroom, although rigorous, becomes a mutual
search for solutions and knowledge. The instructor receives direct feedback
indicating the relevance of his conceptual approach, and is thereby forced to
rethink his approaches and perceptions in light of the experiences of those
whom he is teaching. If such a dynamic is implicit in the clinical methodol-
63. This fact has led to suggestions for change in the second and third years of law
school. See, e.g., Gellhorn, The Second and Third Years of Law Study, 17 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1
(1964). Most clinical programs are limited to second and third year students. Some schools,
however, such as Northwestern University School of Law, have attempted to introduce a
clinical component in the first year. See Hyman, Clinical Education of the First Year, 6
CLEPR NEWSLETrERS, No. 8, at 2 (Feb. 1974). Students at Yale Law School can begin their
general clinical work in the second semester of the first year. See Wizner & Curtis, supra
note 4, at 682.
64. M. KNOWLES, supra note 16, at 41.
[Vol. 35:321338
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ogy, this may be its most pervasive contribution to legal education."
The sharing of responsibility for clinic cases creates the proper at-
mosphere for an optimum andragogical learning experience, which
takes place when the teacher uses a shared experience to point out
and convey to the student points of law, methods of practice, and
elements of the legal process." In this setting all learning does not
have to come directly from the teacher; indeed, when a case is so
novel or complex that the clinical teacher really must struggle to-
gether with the student, the answer may be that there is no an-
swer, and the student both experiences and learns this limit of the
rules of law. 7
Knowles and other educators working in the field of andragogy
have found that the adult students for whom a self-directed learn-
ing setting is designed do not necessarily welcome this type of en-
vironment. When first placed in the position of having to partici-
pate actively in the planning and execution of a learning
experience, students can be skeptical and even resentful before
coming to realize the benefits of this aspect of andragogical meth-
odology. s Michael Meltsner and Philip Schrag also noted this
65. Bellow & Johnson, supra note 10, at 694. The "classroom" to which Bellow and
Johnson refer is a clinical classroom. Cf. Barnhizer, Clinical Education at the Crossroads:
The Need for Direction, 1977 B.Y.U. L. RaV. 1025, 1028 ("On the theoretical plane the only
difference between the Langdellian casebook method and the clinical method of law instruc-
tion is in the nature of what is collected to provide the essential material studied by the law
student.").
66. Assuming at least a modicum of supervision, all clinical programs operate with
students and teachers working together on cases. Clinicians differ on the extent to which
students should assume responsibility. See, e.g., Barnhizer, supra note 3, at 72 n.13 ("Obvi-
ously, the 'primary' lawyering responsibility is shared with the teacher; however .... the
student must, to the extent possible, be given the immediate, on-line responsibility for what
will happen to his client."); Meltsner & Schrag, supra note 4, at 626 (authors concluded
after experimenting with various clinical models that students should have "personal re-
sponsibility for decision-making," with faculty acting "principally as a resource, raising is-
sues but not resolving them-unless a student's chosen course will seriously endanger a
client.").
67. See Bellow & Johnson, supra note 10. Bellow and Johnson noted,
[Clinic students] sense that some of their inadequacies are shared by their instructors
as well, and that solutions to problems in practice are always a matter of informed
choice and always reflective of a combination of uncertainty and knowledge. As a con-
sequence, their relationship with the faculty and supervisors in [a clinical] program
causes a sense of shared purpose and equality which we believe is different from their
prior experiences in law school.
Id. at 693.
68. Knowles found that "[a]dults typically are not prepared for self-directed learning;
they need to go through a process of reorientation to learning as adults ..... M. KNOWLES,
supra note 16, at 40. He also found, however, that once adults take responsibility for their
learning, they experience "a sense of release and exhilaration." Id. Similarly, a study of an
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problem in general terms when they experimented with various
clinical models at Columbia Law School and moved toward a pol-
icy of requiring students to assume a more active role in represent-
ing clients. They noted that this change in approach affected both
students and faculty: "Students and faculty had to come to terms
with the passivity of the student role, and the implicit assumption
of much legal education that the faculty is solely responsible for
whether learning takes place. '6 9 Writing a few years later on their
experiences with the clinical program that they eventually devel-
oped following earlier experimentation with various clinical mod-
els, Meltsner and Schrag reported instances in which students ini-
tially would be confused and even actively hostile when given
responsibility for handling and administering their cases-that is,
for planning and executing their clinical experience. 0
2. Active, Experiential Learning
Experiential learning has been promoted, of course, outside of
andragogically based program for training social workers concluded that students who were
told that they would have to plan their course of study were first upset and resented the
imposition. Gelfand, Rohrich, Nevidon & Starak, supra note 47, at 56-57.
69. Meltsner & Schrag, supra note 4, at 626; see also Himmelstein, Reassessing Law
Schooling: An Inquiry Into the Application of Humanistic Educational Psychology to the
Teaching of Law, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 514, 545 (1978) ("Most legal education today does little
to foster a sense of personal responsibility or 'to encourage students to use initiative in
educating themselves.' Noting 'the passive and doctrinaire qualities' of many law students,
educators have been advocating greater 'student initiative and creativity in learning.' ")
(footnotes omitted) (quoting TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSIONS OF THE LAW, supra note
15, at 43).
70. Meltsner & Schrag, Scenes From a Clinic, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 32-33 (1978).
Meltsner & Schrag stated,
Such [non-directive] encounters [between teacher and student] can go very badly if the
participants do not take into account the norms of the law school. The intern who asks
a supervisor which witnesses he or she should call and hears the supervisor say, "Do
you want me to answer that question now?" may understand the dialogue in terms of a
previous experience with law teachers who hide the ball and never really answer ques-
tions. If we are to succeed in the supervisory role, we must demonstrate that we have
much to give and that we will give it; but that it is the interns' responsibility to decide
when, where, and how to get it.
Id. at 22-23.
This aspect of the students' role in establishing a learning climate of mutual inquiry
with the teacher merges to some extent with the andragogical method of sharing planning
with the students. See supra text accompanying note 38. Closely related to this notion is the
idea that students should share in the evaluation of their work, which is a technique that
Meltsner and Schrag applied.with some difficulties. See Meltsner & Schrag, supra, at 29. In
general neither clinicians nor law faculties have resolved this issue satisfactorily. See gener-
ally Carr, Grading Clinical Students, 26 J. LEGAL EDUC. 223 (1974); Levine, Toward De-
scriptive Grading, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 696 (1971). See also infra text accompanying notes
111-12.
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the context of andragogical theory.71 In fact, experiential learning
is a part of any professional education program that has a clinical
component. An obvious example is medical training, which often is
cited as a model for law schools to consider when designing a pro-
gram of clinical legal education. The use of experiential learning
in clinical programs ties the clinical method of legal instruction
into the second key element of andragogical theory.73
Clinical legal education is experiential learning both in terms
of what the students bring to the learning setting and in terms of
the experiences that the students work through in the clinical pro-
gram itself.7 4 Law students, like any other adults, have their
experiences in life to draw upon in learning. Perhaps more impor-
tant, second year and particularly third year students often have
law-related experience that they can use-and that they expect to
use-in their last two years in law school. Finally, the experience
of actual representation is available to the law student in the
clinic. In sum, there is a role for experience in law teaching, and
that role is best developed through the clinical method. 5
The range of experiences that are available to students in
clinical education programs encompasses more than the normal
lawyering skills of interviewing, counseling, negotiation, and trial
and appellate advocacy. To the extent that broader human rela-
tions skills are a desirable subject of learning in law school,76
clinical legal education-with its emphasis on experiential learn-
ing-offers the opportunity to teach those skills. As Alan Stone
stated, "[T]he student's experience with human problems in the
legal clinic always has the potential of being emotionally real. The
student is directly involved in a case and can explore its social and
71. See generally Houle, supra note 40.
72. See, e.g., Cregar & Glaser, Clinical Teaching in Medicine: Its Relevance for Legal
Education, in LAw SCHOOL OF TH FuTuRE, supra note 1, at 77.
73. See supra notes 26-27 & 40-42 and accompanying text.
74. The experiential learning content of clinical programs is an obvious point that has
not been explored fully in a general context. In a recent article, Kenneth Kreiling consid-
ered the value of experiential learning techniques for both law school training and self-
learning by lawyers in practice. See Kreiling, Clinical Education and Lawyer Competency:
The Process of Learning to Learn from Experience Through Properly Structured Clinical
Supervision, 40 MD. L. REV. 284 (1981). For a discussion of experiential learning as it ap-
plies to one area of law study, see Grismer & Shaffer, Experience-Based Teaching Methods
in Legal Counseling, 19 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 448 (1970).
75. As Justice Clark observed, clinical education is successful because "experience is
the law's peerless teacher." Clark, Student Advocates in the Courts, 1 S'roN HAmL L. REv.
1, 4 (1970).




psychological implications in as great a depth as his motivation
allows.""'
Since clinical legal education provides law students with the
opportunity to relate their own experiences, as well as their new
lawyering experiences presented to them in clinical practice, to
whatever is being taught in the clinical program, supervised prac-
tice can achieve the optimal level of educational meaning and im-
pact. Preble Stolz perhaps summarized this notion best when he
stated that
attitudes towards the world-morals to use an older term-especially insofar
as they influence behavior, probably come more from classmates and experi-
ence than anything that happens in the classroom. Perhaps including clinical
exposure in legal education will improve the law school's capacity to reach
the deeper motivations of its students and thus to influence their careers.78
Gary Bellow and Earl Johnson found that students handling cases
in their clinic "began to be far more interested in their own experi-
ences as a source of theoretical generalization, and far more con-
cerned with theory as a tool for defining and understanding experi-
ence, than they were when they first started. '"7 9 When students use
the experiences that they obtain in the clinic as a tool for learning,
"[t]he clinical process radically alters the usual relationship of
faculty to student. The students have, at last, a body of their own
experience which they can compare to the faculty's assertions and
statements."80
3. Learning, Students' Social Roles, and Problem Solving
The final two elements of Knowles' andragogy-students'
changing social roles and their readiness to learn, and students' fo-
cus on problem solving and their orientation to learning-also fit
the clinical method of legal instruction. These elements, however,
are perhaps less uniquely suited to clinical legal education than
learning through mutual inquiry and active experiential learning.
77. Stone, Legal Education on the Couch, 85 HARv. L. Rzv. 392, 429 (1971). Professor
Stone also observed, "If those who control legal education believe that students should de-
velop human relations skills in law school then the legal clinic is the single best vehicle for
doing so." Id. at 429-30.
78. Stolz, Clinical Experience in American Legal Education: Why Has it Failed?, in
LAW SCHOOL OF THE FUTURE, supra note 1, at 54, 76.
79. Bellow & Johnson, supra note 10, at 693.
80. Id.; see also Bellow, supra note 8, at 384 ("The significant difference in teacher-
student interaction in clinical programs is that the instructor is dealing with people who
have acted, who have confronted in concrete form some of the problems of choice and judg-
ment basic to the role involved .... ).
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Since law students are about to make one of the major social role
changes of their lives-becoming a lawyer-they are naturally
ready to learn about law and lawyering. Regardless of the method
of instruction, they will view whatever they learn as some form of
preparation for solving problems that they will face in their profes-
sional careers. One need not enter into the debate over the quality
and relevance of every part of the law school curriculum to recog-
nize that-at least to some extent-legal education generally is an-
dragogically sound in the categories of readiness to learn and ori-
entation to learning51
Nevertheless, the clinical method of legal instruction does ap-
ply andragogical methodology in these areas more directly and reg-
ularly than does traditional legal education. When a student who is
about to become a lawyer enters a clinical learning environment
and is taught through actual representation of a client in a legal
dispute, optimal compliance with the andragogically dictated sen-
sitivity to the student's readiness to learn is attained.8 2 Thus, one
commentator has observed that "[t]he student response to the
challenge of situations of 'professional responsibility' while partici-
pating in the clinic depends on his thinking of himself as a law-
yer."83 Similarly, notwithstanding the recent appearance of some
innovative problem-oriented law school casebooks," clinical legal
education epitomizes andragogy's problem-centered methodology.
Not only are issues and material presented as problems, but also
"legal training is immediately useful. The student must learn or he
81. See generally supra text accompanying notes 51-59. Traditional legal education
and andragogy also are similar in their immunity from Knowles' criticism of traditional
pedagogy as "premised on an archaic conception of the purpose of education, namely, the
transmittal of knowledge." M. KNOWLES, supra note 16, at 37. He notes that the time span
of social change is shortening while life expectancy is lengthening-an observation that also
holds true for the time span of changes in the law and, presumably, the average life expec-
tancy of lawyers-and concludes that "it is no longer functional to define education as a
process of transmitting what is known; it must now be defined as a lifelong process of dis-
covering what is not known." Id. at 38. Quality traditional legal education, starting with the
first year of law school, is oriented toward teaching students to understand and to partici-
pate in the future development of the law. Cf. Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law
School Classroom, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC. 247, 263 (1978) ("The aim of all education, even in a
law school, is to encourage a process of continuous self-learning that involves the mind,
spirit and body of the whole person.").
82. See Bellow & Johnson, supra note 10, at 693 ("Handling cases gave the students a
concrete and immediate incentive to learn.").
83. Miller, Living Professional Responsibility-Clinical Approach, in CLINICAL EDU-
CATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT, supra note 3, at 99.
84. See, e.g., L. SODERQUIST, SECURTIES REGULATION: A PROBLEM APPROACH (1982).
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will be embarassed before real clients, lawyers and judges.""5
C. Toward An Andragogically Based Model for Clinical Legal
Education
As previously discussed, proponents of clinical legal education
usually have supported their case by emphasizing the new areas of
study that can be introduced into the law school curriculum.86
Most critics of the clinical method also have focused on the sub-
stantive content, arguing that what is taught in clinical programs
need not or should not be taught in law school at all. Only re-
cently have clinicians begun to go beyond the debate over the
value of the substantive content of clinical programs to look criti-
cally at their own methodology and its implementation."8 These ef-
forts differ fundamentally from the literature on effective models
for clinical instruction, which are concerned primarily with ques-
tions of technique,89 and from guidelines for clinical legal educa-
85. Meltsner & Schrag, supra note 4, at 608.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 3-5.
87. This type of criticism is levelled most often at the teaching of lawyering skills,
which is an area in which traditional law teachers seem to have tremendous faith in post-
formal education, on-the-job training. Dean Carrington, for example, has stated that
"[u]niversities should be especially slow to invest heavily in skills training if there are better
instruments readily available. And so there seem to be.... If professionals could be induced
to acquire skills by means of work supervision, this would be the optimal method." Car-
rington, The University Law School and Legal Services, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 402, 431 (1978).
He also believes that the use of "programs of continuing legal education [are] the best
method of transmitting legal skills." Id.; see also Manning, Law Schools and Lawyer
Schools-Two-Tier Legal Education, 26 J. LEGAL EDUC. 379, 381 (1974) ("our law schools,
as presently designed, staffed, and financed, are basically ill-adapted to try to take on the
function of training for litigation"); Vukowich, The Lack of Practical Training in Law
Schools: Criticisms, Causes and Programs for Change, 23 CASE W. RES. L. Rav. 140, 152
(1971) ("the law school should not take on the full responsibility of training students in
practical matters, but should leave such skills to be acquired after graduation"). For a dis-
cussion of the relation between these issues and the teaching of professional responsibility,
see Smith, Is Education for Professional Responsibility Possible?, 40 U. COLo. L. REv. 509
(1968).
At least one commentator has suggested that the introduction of clinical programs into
the traditional law school curriculum actually has been detrimental to legal education. See,
e.g., Allen, supra note 61, at 455-57. Professor Allen's position on this point, however, is
ambivalent. "The issues raised by the new anti-intellectualism cannot be characterized as a
conflict between clinical and classroom instruction.... Nevertheless, candor requires it to
be said that certain aspects of the clinical movement have contributed to the rise of the new
anti-intellectualism." Id. at 456.
88. Professor Barnhizer examined the clinical method of legal instruction primarily in
the context of teaching professional responsibility. See Barnhizer, supra note 3, at 71-72.
More recently, however, Professor Condlin sought to determine generally how clinical law
teachers teach. See Condlin, supra note 9.
89. Articles of this type have dominated the literature on clinical legal education, and
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tion, which seek to establish the characteristics that clinical pro-
grams should have without any particular reference to a theory of
learning.90
Andragogy can be extremely useful in this critical examination
of clinical methodology because it can provide the coherent, theo-
retical framework of a methodology-based justification for clinical
education that has been missing in the attempts to establish vari-
ous content-based justifications. As discussed above, andragogy has
become established as a significant theory of instruction for adult
learners, and its methodology is consistent with the general meth-
ods used to implement clinical programs.9 1 When viewed as an
educational basis for clinical legal education, andragogy can be
useful to clinicians in their attempts to improve the clinical
method of law teaching, to take full advantage of a clinical setting
for legal instruction, and to establish clinical legal education as an
essential element of professional legal education.92
Andragogical theory need not provide a single, definitive
model for clinical legal education to be useful. Indeed, uncritical
reliance on the principles of andragogy is unwarranted if for no
other reason than because andragogy is still a developing field.93
Nonetheless, the four central elements of andragogy9" suggest the
many of them have proved to be immensely valuable to other clinical teachers. See, e.g.,
Andrews, The North Carolina Sentencing Seminar: An Experiment in Controlled Clinical
Legal Education, 28 J. LEGAL EDUC. 317 (1977); Meltner & Schrag, supra note 4; Oliphant,
Reflection on the Lower Court System; The Development of a Unique Clinical Misde-
meanor and a Public Defender Program, 57 MINN. L. REv. 545 (1973); Silverberg, Law
School Legal Aid Clinics: A Sample Plan; Their Legal Status, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 970
(1969).
90. The most recent example of this type of work is found in the 1980 guidelines for
clinical legal education published by the Association of American Law Schools and the
American Bar Association. GUIDELINES FOR CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 15; see
also Allison, The Evaluation of a Clinical Legal Education Program: A Proposal, 27 VAND.
L. REV. 271 (1974); Gorman, supra note 4, at 561-73.
91. See supra notes 16-18 & 60-85 and accompanying text.
92. Cf. Barnhizer, supra note 3, at 70 (clinical legal education is now in the phase of
"[c]onsolidation, reflection and refinement of... experimental findings" and is moving into
the phase of "[c]larification and assertion of the proper role of clinical education in relation
to the total curriculum").
93. See supra text accompanying note 21. Of course, clinical legal educators can con-
tribute to the developing field of andragogy. Thus, a study could be undertaken to evaluate
the effectiveness of traditional and clinical law teachers in the context of the major method-
ological elements of andragogy. Questionnaires and noting scales have been developed to
measure teaching methods in relation to andragogical theory. See M. Kirwin, Development
of an Instrument to Measure the Teaching Behavior of Adult Educators (1980) (unpub-
lished report available from Educational Resources Information Center, Washington, D.C.).
94. See supra notes 33-45 and accompanying text.
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beginnings of a model for clinical legal education that addresses
the three major issues which legal educators have debated in this
field: The use of actual clients rather than simulations, the method
and extent of supervision by clinical faculty, and the types of cases
to be handled in a clinical program.
1. Actual Client Representation
An andragogically based model for clinical legal education
should rely heavily on actual client representation. 5 A relationship
based on shared, mutual inquiry simply cannot be established
through the alternative technique of simulation. An effective, com-
petent simulation must be pre-planned so that even if the instruc-
tor participates in the simulation, the law student knows that there
is nothing like shared inquiry or a co-counsel relationship between
student and teacher. In fact, it is likely that the instructor would
not participate at all in the simulation and instead let the student
work through the problem alone.98 In an actual client setting, on
the other hand, the student and teacher are forced to work to-
gether at every step in the case because crucial decisions may have
to be made at any time that could be critical to the client's claim
or defense.9 7 As a result, a co-counsel relationship develops be-
tween the student and the teacher that continues throughout the
student's involvement in the case and offers the student opportu-
nities for valuable learning experiences both at expected and unex-
pected moments during representation. ' The differences between
the use of actual clients and the use of simulations in establishing
an atmosphere of mutual inquiry can be seen perhaps most clearly
in the area of decisions on case strategy. Such decisions are so im-
portant in actual client representation that the clinical instructor
95. This proposition means that all students would be engaged primarily in the repre-
sentation of actual clients, but it is not meant to denigrate the value of simulations as a
supplemental method of instruction. Simulations can be particularly valuable in a clinical
program when they are used to help prepare students for interviewing, taking depositions,
and certain other aspects of trial work.
96. Some find this to be the unique advantage of simulations because the student can
practice independently without doing any harm to the mock client. See, e.g., Harbaugh,
supra note 15, at 211; Meltsner & Schrag, supra note 4, at 597.
97. How closely the instructor should supervise the student is itself an issue that
should be determined according to andragogical theory. See infra text accompanying notes
108-10.
98. Of course, a simulation could be constructed in which the student and the instruc-
tor work together either after an initial interview or before the taking of a deposition or the
commencement of a mock trial. Even this limited amount of shared lawyering, however,
would be unusual in a simulation. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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must examine and participate in the student's analysis and judg-
ments. In a simulation setting, it is most likely that the instructor
would not participate in any case strategy at all, and the advan-
tages of such an experience would be lost.
Although an actual client representation setting makes it pos-
sible for the student and the teacher to establish a continuous co-
counsel relationship, the proposition does not follow that the
teacher and the student should work together on every aspect of
all the student's cases. The optimal andragogical setting is one in
which students are given the opportunity to learn through their
own initiative by working together with-rather than being domi-
nated by-the teacher. When students and teachers work together
on actual cases, a true "climate of adultness" consistent with the
self-concept of law students is maintained because the students
practice together with their instructors in a setting in which their
participation means something not only to themselves, but also to
the instructors with whom they work. A teacher representing an
actual client in conjunction with a student relies heavily on the
student's work and, therefore, is deeply concerned with how the
student performs during the represention. In such a setting, even
though the instructors are set apart because of the knowledge that
they can convey to students who are working with them, they are
not removed entirely from the process of learning, as tends to be
the case with simulations. Instructors thus are far less likely to en-
gage in the type of one-way transmittal of knowledge that is anti-
thetical to andragogy.9
Actual client representation is also necessary to involve law
students in andragogically sound active, experiential learning. Al-
though role playing is a type of experiential learning,100 law stu-
dents must be allowed to practice law on behalf of real clients if a
clinical program is to take full advantage of the role of experience
in adult learning. Actual client representation is real and, there-
fore, andragogically effective.10 1 Simulations, on the other hand,
99. This does not mean that clinical teachers who are engaged in actual representation
of clients will never sit down and lecture to their students concerning some aspect of the
case. In some situations a one-way transmittal of knowledge is necessary because of the
complexity or the particular circumstance of the case. See infra text accompanying notes
108-09.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 40-42.
101. See Sacks, supra note 4. Professor Sacks notes,
If an experience seems real, the beneficial effects on students are likely to be several.
Students have more interest in the subject matter and are better motivated to learn.
They work harder and pay closer attention to what is happening. They tend to learn
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are recognized as imaginary and thus are less effective as learning
experiences, since law students may not be willing to relate what
they were taught in simulations to other lawyering experiences
that they have had or will have outside of law school.10 2
Similarly, while clinical legal education possesses the potential
to take full advantage of law students' readiness to learn, the lack
of reality inherent in simulations can undermine that potential.
When representing actual clients, law students are in fact lawyers;
accordingly, they are fully aware that what they are learning re-
lates to what they came to law school to learn. In a simulation set-
ting, however, students can become unsure about the relationship
between the simulation and actual practice of law, and, conse-
quently, they 'can become less interested in what the teacher is try-
ing to teach.1 63
2. Close Supervision by Clinical Faculty
Proper implementation of andragogical methodology in a law
school clinical setting requires that clinical faculty supervise stu-
dents closely and directly.10 4 Probably the most important element
of an andragogically sound model for clinical supervision is the es-
tablishment of a co-counsel relationship between the student and
the teacher. This method of supervision allows students to learn
through mutual inquiry, which is consistent with andragogical the-
ory,105 and to make the most of the learning opportunities that are
available through actual client representation. Placing students
outside of a law school controlled setting in which they are likely
either to work unattended or to be limited to observing the "real
lawyers" in the office would dilute the educational value of having
students represent actual clients. Both of these circumstances are
things at a deeper level and thus to remember them longer.
Id. at 294.
102. See Meltsner & Schrag, supra note 4, at 608 ("Students are highly skeptical that
role play reflects reality, that the models of conduct extrapolated from role play are valid
outside of a law school or that the simulations created by the instructors abstract the appro-
priate elements from reality.").
103. See supra text accompanying notes 81-85.
104. Clinical faculty should be qualified law teachers who are dedicated to teaching
law students by using the clinical method. Issues of the teachers' status and standing in the
law school community do not bear directly on the questions that arise in implementing an
andragogical approach. See Leleiko, The Opportunity to be Different and Equal-An Anal-
ysis of the Interrelationships Between Tenure, Academic Freedom and the Teaching of
Professional Responsibility in Orthodox and Clinical Legal Education, 55 NOTRE DAME
LAw. 485 (1980).
105. See supra text accompanying notes 97-98.
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totally at odds with the type of shared responsibility for learning
that andragogical theory envisions.106
Clinical faculty, however, must do more than just work to-
gether with students on cases. Clinical instructors must be willing
and able to teach their students once a proper andragogical setting
is established. Although the teacher and the student working to-
gether as co-counsel create Knowles' "spirit of the mutuality, '107
the teacher is largely responsible for taking advantage of this set-
ting and turning it into an effective learning opportunity. A law
teacher working on a case with a law student must be able to guide
the student toward learning whatever lawyering skills or substan-
tive material the student needs to know to participate effectively
in handling the case. This guidance can be provided without un-
dermining the co-counsel relationship between the teacher and the
student or sacrificing the teacher's responsibility to teach, particu-
larly if the teacher follows the andragogical prescriptions of being
sensitive to the student's role as a self-directed learner in planning
the learning experience and of giving the student the opportunity
to choose how to make the most of the learning opportunity. Thus,
the teacher and student should share the assignment of responsi-
bilities in a particular case.
Since clinical teachers are still teachers and their co-counsel
are still their students, the possibility always exists that mutual
inquiry will be forsaken and that the teacher will take control of
the representation by lecturing to the student and directing him or
her to do what the teacher knows-or has determined-must be
done.108 An andragogical model would specifically discourage this
type of supervision, except to the extent that it is necessary to en-
sure competent representation in a particular case. Instead of ex-
106. Cf. Meltsner & Schrag, supra note 4, at 590 (authors became "concerned by the
passive roles in which students were sometimes cast" in a test litigation clinic at Columbia
because "they were not equipped to handle the responsibility"). See generally Frakt, Super-
vising Students in Legal Clinics Outside the Law School, 3 CLEPR NzwsLTER, No. 2, at
1 (Oct. 1970).
107. See supra text accompanying note 35.
108. The use of the clinical method does not necessarily result in a satisfactory rela-
tionship between the teacher and the student. Data discussed in a recent article by Robert
Condlin suggested to him that "only the more stylized forms of manipulative classroom
technique may be absent from clinical practice instruction-that the substance of practice
instruction may track the patterns that clinical teachers profess to avoid." Condlin, supra
note 9, at 226. Professor Condlin's data consisted of transcripts of supervision sessions held
by eleven clinical teachers at seven law schools. Id. at 249, n.66. See also Himmelstein,
supra note 69, at 541 ("A clinical seminar can function, albeit unsatisfactorily, with authori-
tarian instructors and submissive or blindly competitive students.").
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tensive lecturing and excessive direction, students should be en-
couraged to decide when to ask questions and when to explore for
answers on their own. In other words, the student should help the
teacher decide when the teacher needs to direct and teach, and
when the student can be left alone.10 9 Close supervision, therefore,
does not mean a constant faculty presence.11 0
Evaluation, of course, is an important element of any educa-
tional program, and students in a clinical setting must be evalu-
ated as well. Although traditional grading methods usually are
based on the one-sided evaluations of students by teachers-which
is disfavored in andragogical theory-the solution is not necessar-
ily to eliminate grades or to reduce the rigor of the evaluation pro-
cess by means of a pass/fail system."' Instead, the student, to-
gether with the instructor, should assess the student's performance
at critical points during representation in order to evaluate the
work in the case, to determine the student's learning needs and to
measure the student's overall progress. Just how students finally
are graded or evaluated at the end of the course is not so impor-
tant, since the positive, andragogically based process of shared
evaluation between the student and the teacher already will have
taken place.1
3. Cases Selected for Educational Value
Although the use of actual client representation and close, di-
rect supervision by clinical faculty are the most important ele-
ments of an andragogically based model for clinical legal educa-
tion, andragogical theory can be implemented most effectively in a
law school clinic if the cases that are selected for law students
maximize the educational value of their clinical experience. This
does not mean that by adopting this approach law school clinics
must forego representing groups of clients that traditionally have
been underrepresented or providing a socially valuable by-product
of legal services to the community. Indeed, cases arguably should
109. Meltsner and Schrag followed this approach at Columbia and experienced some
difficulties. See supra note 70.
110. See supra note 66.
111. The implications of adopting a pass/fail system, as opposed to letter or numerical
grades, are more complex than a simple reduction in the rigor of evaluation. See generally
Lempert, Law School Grading: An Experiment With Pass-Fail, 24 J. LEGAL EDUc. 251
(1972).
112. Regardless of whether the clinical work is graded or simply "passed," the basis
for the grade or pass should be the evaluations of the student's work and the student's
progress during the course of representation. See generally Carr, supra note 70.
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be chosen that demonstrate the positive role which the legal pro-
fession can play in society in order to instill in law students a re-
sponsible professional attitude at a time when they are particularly
receptive to learning about the profession.113
One goal in an andragogical case selection process should be to
choose from among all the types of cases that are available the
ones that are the most likely to appear to students to be relevant
both to their changing roles as student lawyers and to their upcom-
ing entry into the legal profession. In other words, to maximize law
students' readiness to learn from a clinical experience, the cases
must present real legal disputes and must require the use of law-
yering skills. Thus, an andragogical model would include a case se-
lection process that would favor cases such as administrative ap-
peals from denials of various public benefits and contested eviction
proceedings in which law students can act as lawyers, rather than
cases such as multiple debt actions without viable defenses that
require financial counseling and cases involving routine applica-
tions for benefits that can be resolved by a case worker or a social
worker. 114 For similar reasons, students should be able to choose to
the extent possible those cases that appear most interesting to
them.
This application of andragogical theory does not mean that
cases would be selected to teach students how to handle a particu-
lar type of problem or how to practice in a particular court; in-
stead, cases would be chosen because they emphasize the funda-
mental elements of law practice. In this way the maximum number
of students will be motivated to learn, and what they learn will
have the broadest impact on their future practice. The use of a
limited range of cases that allow the instruction to concentrate on
general principles of trial practice, the lawyering process, or profes-
sional responsibility, will make the absence of certain other types
of cases that are not usually represented in the clinical caseload
113. Cf. Himmeistein, supra note 69, at 521 ("Law students seem bored and unin-
spired by the present form of legal education. Many are searching for a professional identity
to match their aspirations, and are disappointed in what they find."). See generally Swords,
supra note 4.
114. Proper case selection is an extremely important aspect of clinical methodology
independent from andragogical theory. Which cases should be chosen and how to achieve a
proper balance of cases in a clinical setting are problems that some commentators have
addressed in limited contexts, but which need fuller consideration. See, e.g., Barnhizer,
supra note 3, at 71; Meltsner & Schrag, supra note 4, at 626. Of course, valuable clinical
cases exist in which law students can participate as lawyers together with other, nonlawyer
professionals. See, e.g., Lowry & Kennedy, supra note 61.
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irrelevant. 1 5 The important point from an andragogical perspec-
tive is that students must be able to relate what they are learning
from the clinic experience to their own projected future careers.
Clinical programs operating under this type of case selection proc-
ess will capitalize on law students' particular readiness to learn and
their orientation toward learning; they will also avoid the danger of
becoming a narrow, mechanical course in how to file a divorce or
how to defend against a public housing eviction in the local trial
court.
Finally, case selection can be important both in the establish-
ment of an atmosphere of mutuality between the student and the
teacher and in the creation of a setting for active, experiential
learning. The most routine types of cases such as uncontested, no-
fault divorces should be excluded because a meaningful co-counsel
relationship cannot be established when students are handling
cases that are too simple to require any serious work by the
faculty. On the other hand, other relatively routine matters, such
as certain tort cases, can be valuable learning experiences because
there will be genuine mutual inquiry between the student and the
teacher whenever they work together preparing a particular case or
handling that particular case on behalf of a client.11 6 Extremely
complex cases can present similar problems if students are unable
to assume any significant responsibility in the client's representa-
tion. In such a case students effectively would be removed from the
active experience of representing a client, or they would be limited
to performing such simple tasks that the establishment of a co-
counsel relationship would be impossible.1 This problem can be
115. In fact, clinical programs have begun to expand the subject matter coverage of
their caseloads. Thus, a number of law schools have begun to offer federal income tax clinics
in cooperation with the Internal Revenue Service. See generally Growing Pains in Law
School Tax Clinics: A Report on the Experience at Hofstra, Southern Methodist and
Michigan, 10 CLEPR NEwSLWMrER No. 4, at 1 (1978). There also have been proposals to use
clinical methods to teach traditional subjects. See, e.g., Daurer, Expanding Clinical Teach-
ing Methods Into the Commercial Law Curriculum, 25 J. LEGAL EDuc. 76 (1973). For de-
scriptions of a representative sampling of law school clinical programs, see Selected Sum-
maries, supra note 62.
116. If routine cases are used, the teacher should not permit the extensive use of form
pleadings or form questions for discovery or trial. Unless students are given at least some
responsibility for drafting pleadings and formulating questions in their cases, they may well
feel that they are not really participating in the representation, and, as a result, an opportu-
nity for active, experiential learning may be lost.
117. Meltsner and Schrag experienced precisely this problem in their test litigation
clinic at Columbia. See Meltsner & Schrag, supra note 4, at 590-91. For an earlier descrip-
tion of the test litigation clinic at Columbia, see Meltsner, Clinical Education at Columbia:
The Columbia Legal Assistance Resource, 24 J. LEGAL EDuc. 237 (1972). While having the
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avoided, of course, by assigning students manageable portions of
complex cases and by choosing cases that are challenging but still
within law students' capabilities.11
IV. CONCLUSION
Clinical legal education offers law students the opportunity to
work together with faculty on cases that present the types of
problems which law students want to learn how to solve. An-
dragogical theory holds that adult learners such as law students
should be taught through mutual inquiry between teacher and stu-
dent, through the use of actual experience, and with the recogni-
tion that students are ready and oriented to learn about that which
they perceive to be relevant to their current social roles and profes-
sional goals. The clinical method of law teaching adds an impor-
tant andragogical component to professional legal education; at the
same time, andragogy provides both a theoretical basis for clinical
legal education and some suggestions about a model for imple-
menting the clinical method. Clinical legal education works in large
part because it is andragogically sound. Legal education in general
can benefit from andragogical theory,119 and the recognition of the
andragogical basis of clinical legal education perhaps can hasten
the integration of the clinical method into the mainstream of legal
education.
clinical teacher do the work on a complex case so the student can observe a model has some
advantages, andragogical theory would not find this approach appropriate for adult learners.
118. Many clinical programs include law reform or otherwise difficult litigation in their
caseloads. These cases can be used most effectively when individual students' participation
is tailored to their respective capabilities.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 51-59. Teaching methods developed by
clinical law teachers can be of great value to all law teachers as they seek to improve legal
education in general. See Munger, Clinical Legal Education: The Case Against Separatism,
29 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 715 (1980).
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